Supreme Court: In a batch of criminal appeals against a decision of the Patna High Court upholding the Trial Court’s decision, wherein seven persons were found guilty of abducting and murdering the sister-in-law of the informant, the Division Bench of Bela M. Trivedi and Satish Chandra Sharma*, JJ., stated that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. The Bench figured reasonable doubts, which were irreconcilable and struck at the foundation of the prosecution’s case.
For no direct evidence on record to prove the commission of murder by the convicts and the circumstantial evidence emanating from the facts surrounding the offence of abduction, such as the testimonies of eye-witnesses failed to meet the test of proof and could not be termed as proved in the eyes of law, the Bench acquitted the seven convicts and directed for their release.
As regards motive, the Bench stated that-
“Motive has a bearing only when the evidence on record is sufficient to prove the ingredients of the offences under consideration, without the proof of foundational facts, the case of the prosecution cannot succeed on the presence of motive alone. Moreover, the motive in the present matter could operate both ways. The accused persons and the eyewitnesses belong to the same family and the presence of a property related dispute is evident. In a hypothetical sense, both the sides could benefit from implicating the other. In such circumstances, placing reliance upon motive alone could be a double-edged sword.”
Factual Matrix
The brother-in-law/ informant of the deceased lodged a First Information Report (‘FIR’), alleging that seven persons abducted the deceased from her house. The seven convicts, caught hold of the informant and as soon as he raised the alarm and started shouting, two persons pointed out pistols towards him and directed him to remain silent. Thereafter, they dragged the deceased out of the house and took her away.
Subsequently, the chargesheet was filed against the seven accused persons for offences under Sections , , , , , / and of the . Later, A-6 and 7 were distinctly charged for offences punishable under Sections and read with Section of the . The Trial Court convicted five accused persons for offences under Section / and / of , and acquitted A-6 and 7. The Patna High Court, upheld the conviction of the five convicts and set aside the acquittal of A-6 and 7 by finding them guilty of the commission of offences under Sections / and / of .
Issues
Whether the finding of guilt arrived at by the High Court was sustainable in light of the evidence on record and whether the approach of the High Court was in line with the settled law for reversing an acquittal into conviction in a criminal appeal?
Analysis and Decision
The Court pointed out that it was evident that the offence of murder was committed after the offence of abduction. There is a sequential relationship between the two offences and thus, in order to set up a case for the commission of the offence of murder, it is necessary to prove the commission of the offence of abduction by the convicts.
For the offence under Section of , the Court examined the testimonies of the witnesses. The Court raised doubts on the brother-in-law’s testimony, stating that per his version, the first eye-witnesses of the incident ought to have been the three persons and the tenant, who opened the latch of the house. The Court also pointed out that there was no explanation for the non-examination of these natural eyewitnesses. The version becomes more doubtful when, in the FIR, no pistol was mentioned to be with A-6, who allegedly threatened the brother-in-law, whereas, in the statement recorded before the Trial Court, this fact was introduced, which was indicative of improvement. The Court also noted that the brother-in-law did not try to prevent the abduction.
Furthermore, the allegation that A-6 assaulted him with fists and slaps, was not deposed before the Trial Court in his examination in chief. There was no recovery of pistol from any of the convicts. Regarding, the testimonies of three other eye-witnesses, the Court opined that none of the three eye-witnesses were required to visit Sikandra Chowk or Simaltalla for going to their village. The Court added that as per natural human conduct, the least they could have done was to follow the convicts in their jeep. They admittedly had a ready vehicle with them.
Apropos, the concern that none of the eye-witnesses was an independent witness, the Court stated that, ordinarily there is no rule of law to discard the testimonies of the witnesses merely because they were known to the victim or belonged to her family. The Court said that the non-examination of natural witnesses and many other neighbours who admittedly came out of their houses to witness the offence, coupled with the fact that the projected eye-witnesses failed to explain their presence at the place of occurrence, rendered the entire version of the prosecution as improbable and unreliable. The Court also reiterated that when the version put forth by the interested witnesses comes under a shadow of doubt, the rule of prudence demands that the independent public witnesses must be examined and corroborating material must be gathered. More so, when public witnesses were readily available and the offence had not taken place in the bounds of closed walls.
The Court also expressed doubts as to the residence of the deceased. The Court noted that as per the statements, the deceased lived in her father’s house at Simaltalla (which was the focal point of the dispute in the family), however, the investigating officer had inspected the house and no direct material, except some make-up articles, was found to indicate that the deceased was residing there. The prosecution failed to examine even one co-habitant to prove the said fact that she resided there and no personal belongings of the deceased, such as clothes, footwear, utensils etc., could be found in the entire house.
With respect to the time of death, a discrepancy was flagged in light of the post-mortem report, based on which the time of death must have been around 5:00 PM on 30-08-1985, which was contrary to the evidence of the brother-in-law that the incident took place around 10:00 PM on 30-08-1985. To this, the Court clarified that- a post-mortem report is generally not considered as conclusive evidence of the facts mentioned in the report regarding the cause of death, time of death etc. It could always be corroborated with other direct evidence on record such as ocular evidence of the eye-witnesses. However, when there is no other credible evidence on record to contradict the report, the facts stated in the post-mortem report are generally taken as true.
The Court stated that, in the matter at hand, the evidence of the eye-witnesses was wholly unreliable including on the aspect of time of death. Thus, there was no reason to doubt the post-mortem report and the findings therein.
Conclusively, the order of conviction by the Trial Court and the High Court were not sustainable. Moreover, the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal of A-6 and A-7. Accordingly, the impugned judgment as well as the Trial Court’s judgment (to the extent of conviction of A-1 to A-5) were set aside, and all seven convicts were acquitted of all the charges levelled upon them.
CASE DETAILS
| Citation: Appellants : Vijay Singh Respondents : State of Bihar | Advocates who appeared in this case For Petitioner(s): Fauzia Shakil, AOR; R. K. Dash, Sr. Adv.; Amit Sharma, AOR; Dipesh Sinha, Adv.; Pallavi Barua, Adv.; Aparna Singh, Adv.; Ajay Kumar Singh, AOR For Respondent(s): Shivam Singh, Adv.; Kartikay Aggarwal, Adv.; Manish Kumar, AOR; Shantanu Sagar, AOR |
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