Cost and benefit: On Bangladesh, India and Sheikh Hasina
India cannot hand over Sheikh Hasina to the unelected Yunus government
Amidst signs that New Delhi and Dhaka are trying to resolve other issues that have marred their ties in the last few months, the issue of Bangladesh’s demand that India extradite Sheikh Hasina remains intractable, with neither side budging. In December, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri was able to convey during his Dhaka visit, that India remains a friend. He also reaffirmed the continuity in ties in trade, energy, infrastructure and connectivity; the two sides appear to have calmed the situation at the border as well. Finally, the government indicated to a parliamentary committee that while Ms. Hasina remains in Delhi as India’s guest, it had no truck with her political pronouncements and messages targeting Mr. Yunus. The situation seemed to shift last week, as Bangladesh sent New Delhi a “note verbale” or diplomatic missive demanding Ms. Hasina’s extradition to face trial for cases that include corruption, and a Dhaka-based International Crimes Tribunal charge that she had perpetrated ‘crimes against humanity’ in ordering a police crackdown on student protesters. The India-Bangladesh extradition treaty of 2013, amended in 2016, sets out the course of procedures quite clearly, which needs to be pursued through a more formal representation from Bangladesh to India. The note verbale appears to be meant only to assuage domestic political constituencies, while India’s External Affairs Ministry’s response — not rejecting it outright — seems to be a non-escalatory way of dealing with the situation.
While the legalities of the request can be the subject of protracted negotiations, it is important to ensure that the issue does not hold India-Bangladesh relations hostage. The Yunus government must understand that the history of India’s relationship with Ms. Hasina and her family is forged in the sacrifices made in both countries for the liberation of Bangladesh. The assassination of her father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and members of her family in 1975, and her first exile in India, strengthened the bond. It is futile to expect that India would simply hand Ms. Hasina over, when she has sought refuge here, and no amount of coercive pressure could force an Indian government to comply. The decision to shelter the Dalai Lama in 1959, for example, has not wavered despite Chinese pressure. Furthermore, bringing Ms. Hasina to account is not the mandate of the interim regime, and should be pursued by a government duly elected by the Bangladeshi people. In Delhi, there must be a recognition that the actions of Ms. Hasina’s government have scarred the nation. The fact that she is making political statements with ease from Indian soil is likely to embitter ties and New Delhi must conduct a full cost-benefit analysis of how helpful these statements are. Given the consequences of a tense border and geopolitical turmoil, both countries must learn to deal with the issue diplomatically — in a separate silo from other aspects of their important relationship.