Over the borderline: On the India-China deal
The agreement between India and China opens new opportunities
China’s confirmation on Tuesday (October 22, 2024) of an agreement to resolve its four-year military standoff with India, as announced by Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri on Monday (October 21, 2024), is welcome news, given the possibilities it opens up for bilateral ties. Since April 2020, when China suddenly transgressed along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), followed by India’s counter-deployment, bilateral relations had ground to a halt. Anger in India, over the June 2020 Galwan clashes in which 20 Indian soldiers were killed, justifiably brimmed over, and despite steps to avoid further violence and disengagement at five friction points, mistrust over whether the PLA would revert to positions prior to 2020 or “status quo ante” remained. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s statement that China has agreed to restore troops to pre-2020 levels and positions must be verified, but it is indeed a positive move if true. The announcement of the agreement on “patrolling arrangements” came just ahead of the BRICS Summit in Russia which Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping are attending, setting the stage for a possible formal interaction for the first time since 2020. Prior to this, the leaders had close engagement in 18 one-on-one meetings from 2014-19 including two intense retreats in Wuhan and Mamallapuram. Since 2020 they have held informal chats, on summit sidelines. Though trade ties remained at record highs, relations in areas including investment, travel and visas were snapped. It remains to be seen whether these will recover.
The government must ensure that the “next steps” Mr. Misri referred to are carried out in as transparent a manner as possible so as to engender trust in the process. This is important as even though China insists that its troops are in its own territory and Mr. Modi has said that “no one has come in or taken Indian posts”, the perception is that Chinese troops have in fact occupied more Indian land than before, and have denied Indian soldiers patrolling rights and villagers in Eastern Ladakh access to their grazing lands. The government’s repeated refusal to fully brief Parliament or to allow media access to the forward areas has added to misgivings over the situation on the ground. It is necessary to demonstrate that the Chinese troops have indeed vacated the forward areas. Premature exclamations of success or the chest-thumping witnessed after the 2017 Doklam disengagement are best avoided, as China doubled down on its presence on the plateau subsequently. Proceeding with caution while learning from past lessons is the best way forward. The two sides will need to discuss whether the old framework of the 1993 Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement and the 2013 Border Defence Cooperation Agreement still hold, or whether a new modus vivendi is needed to manage their differences over the border from this point on.