Delhi High Court: In a petition filed by the petitioner, an ISIS convict seeking concurrent running of sentences imposed upon him, i.e., sentence imposed in a National Investigation Agency (‘NIA’) case by the Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala House Court, New Delhi along with the sentence imposed upon him by the Special Judge, NIA in another special case of NIA, a Single Judge Bench of Swarana Kanta Sharma, J. held that there was no reason to exercise discretion under Section of the (‘CrPC’) since the offences committed by the petitioner could not be termed as part of a ‘same transaction’, a lenient approach had been adopted by the Courts, and that the offences committed were grave and serious in nature.
Background
The Court of NIA Special Judge at Greater Bombay convicted the petitioner for offences punishable under Section of the (‘IPC’) and Sections / / / of (‘UAPA’) vide judgment dated 07-01-2022.
Thereafter, vide order on sentence dated 07-01-2022, the Trial Court (Greater Bombay) sentenced the petitioner to five years of rigorous imprisonment under Section of and Section of , eight years of rigorous imprisonment under Section of , and seven years of rigorous imprisonment under Section / of , and it was directed that these sentences would run concurrently making the actual sentence of eight years.
Further, in another case of NIA, the Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala House Court convicted the petitioner under Sections / / of and Section of sentencing him to five years of rigorous punishment under Section 120B of IPC and seven years of rigorous imprisonment under Section , , and of which were to run concurrently, making the actual sentence of seven years.
However, the fact of the petitioner’s conviction by the Trial Court of Bombay was not brought to the attention of the Trial Court of Delhi, due to which, the Trial Court of Delhi could not exercise its statutory discretion under Section of to determine the manner of execution of sentence, considering that the petitioner was already serving the previous sentence.
The main ground for the present matter was that since the Trial Court of Delhi had become functus officio after the pronouncement of judgment, the petitioner had no other remedy but to approach this Court seeking the exercise of its inherent and extra-ordinary jurisdiction, for a direction that the sentence pronounced by the Trial Court of Delhi run concurrently with the sentence previously pronounced by the Trial Court of Bombay.
Analysis and Decision
The Court noted that the issue which fell for consideration in the present matter was whether the discretion as per Section of should be exercised by this Court, by invoking its extraordinary and inherent powers.
After analyzing Section of , the Court stated that the general rule in such a scenario is that the imprisonment that had been awarded subsequently shall commence operating when the previous imprisonment expires, and the exception to this rule is the discretion provided to the Courts.
Further, the Court analyzed the role of the petitioner in both matters against him wherein the petitioner was found to be involved in an ISIS-related case concerning the planning of an attack during the Ardh Kumbh Mela in Haridwar, Uttarakhand and a criminal conspiracy that was aimed at promoting jihadist activities of ISIS.
The Court took note of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Asst. Collector of Customs and in Neera Yadav v. CBI that sentences ought not to be allowed concurrently in cases involving different transactions, different facts, etc.
Further, the Court noted that the petitioner was convicted in two different cases registered by the NIA and vide different judgments wherein the co-accused persons were also different. Moreover, the Court opined that the offences committed in the two cases, for which the petitioner was convicted, could not be termed to be a part of a ‘same transaction’.
The Court also noted that merely because the petitioner had been convicted under similar provisions of IPC and UAPA in both cases, this could not entitle him to seek concurrent running of sentence since the facts of the cases did not form part of the same transaction.
The Court stated that another relevant factor that had to be considered for exercising discretion under Section of was the total period of sentence awarded to the petitioner in the two cases. Further, while referring to Mohd. Akhtar Hussain (supra), the Court noted that the petitioner could have been sentenced to life imprisonment for life in both cases, but lenient views were taken by the Trial Courts, and thus, opined that the petitioner could not obtain any benefit from the decision of Mohd. Akhtar Hussain (supra) insofar as it relates to the application of the ‘totality principle’ to exercise discretion under Section of .
The Court stated that another important and crucial factor to be considered in the present matter was the gravity of the offence committed by the petitioner and its impact on society. The Court also mentioned that the impact of terrorist activities on society is profound and far-reaching as these crimes can sow fear and insecurity among communities, as well as disrupt social harmony.
Further, the Court strongly opined that cases such as the present one have to be dealt with the same or higher degree of sternness as was shown by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Zahid v. State .
Therefore, the Court found no reason to exercise discretion under Section of , and while dismissing the petition, held that the sentence of imprisonment to the petitioner by the Trial Court of Delhi shall commence upon expiration of the sentence pronounced by the Trial Court of Bombay.
[Mohsin Ibrahim Sayyed v. National Investigation Agency, W.P.(CRL) 463 of 2023, Decided on 07-06-2024]
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For Petitioner — Advocate Siddharth Sunil
For Respondent — SPP Akshai Malik, Advocate Khawar Saleem, Advocate Arun Kumar
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