This article is written by
. It deals with a thorough analysis of the judgement pronounced in the case of Vellikannu vs. R. Singaperumal and Ors. (2005) where the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India dealt with the question of whether a person who has committed a murder is entitled to a share in the deceased victim’s coparcenary property.
The word “coparcenary” is a narrow institute and it majorly included male lineal descendants of a common ancestor. Prior to 2005, the rights and liabilities entitled to coparceners were restricted to just male members of a common ancestor till the third generation. This scenario was changed to make the traditional laws more gender-neutral and women were given rights in coparcenary property. The 2005 Amendment brought in another change and the concept of survivorship was abolished. Devolution of the property was now to be taken up by either testamentary succession or in accordance with the rules of succession enshrined under . This article deals with the facts, arguments advanced and judgement pronounced in the case of where the court went into deep discussions about the nature of coparcenary. It is emphasised that the which made major amendments to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was enacted on 09 September 2005 and the judgement in the case at hand was pronounced on 06 June 2005. The court has applied the rule of survivorship which is now abolished in India.
The disputed properties are the self-acquired properties of Ramasami Konar and the first defendant in the case is his only son. The plaintiff is the son’s wife, meaning Ramasami Konar’s daughter-in-law. Ramasami Konar’s wife was divorced and already married someone else and was residing separately. On 10th October 1972, the first defendant that is the son murdered Ramasami Konar, his father and was convicted under of the which under the new criminal laws is equivalent to of . The son was convicted of the murder of Ramasami Konar and was given life imprisonment. Since the son had murdered the father, he was not entitled to any of the properties of the deceased father and the plaintiff who is the wife of the son claimed that she was entitled to the entire estate left by the deceased. The plaintiff citing Sections 25 and 27 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 contended that since the son was the murderer he was not entitled to the property and the property would be devolved in such a way that the son is presumed to be dead at the time of the partition and hence claimed to be the owner of all the properties. After the release of the son, the plaintiff and defendant lived together for some time before she was driven out of the house.
The plaintiff requested a declaration which would affirm her right in the deceased’s estate. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was not a legal heir of Ramasami Konar and that the suit was not maintainable. It was also alleged that all the properties acquired by Ramasami Konar were joint family property and the defendant will acquire them through the rule of survivorship.
The plaintiff sought a declaration to affirm her entitlement to the deceased’s estate. The defendant counter-argued that the plaintiff was not a legal heir of Ramasami Konar and that the suit was not maintainable. The defendant also claimed that all properties acquired by Ramasami Konar were joint family property which he would inherit through the rule of survivorship.
By the order dated 31 March 1980, the Trial Court held that the disputed property is joint family property and the first defendant is entitled to it and the second defendant is a cultivating tenant. However, the court also noted that the first defendant had murdered his father and therefore is not entitled to claim any rights under of the Hindu Succession Act, 1973 which is read with Sections 25 and 27 of the Act. All these Sections have been briefed in the later part of the article under the heading “Laws Discussed”. As per the proviso given in Section 6, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for half a share in the property and was granted the same.
Aggrieved by the Trial Court’s decision, the first defendant made an appeal to the Lower Appellate Court. The court upheld the Trial Court’s findings but modified the decree and treated it as a preliminary decree. The court determined that the first defendant should be considered non-existent and that the plaintiff as a class-I heir under of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is entitled to a share in the property. The appeal was subsequently dismissed.
Aggrieved by the decision of the Lower Appellate Court, the first defendant submitted a second appeal before the High Court of Madras. The High Court dealt with two major questions.
For the first question, the High Court of Madras held that the judgement of the Criminal Court can be taken into consideration.
Moving on to the second question, which decided if the plaintiff is entitled to inherit the deceased father-in-law’s estate and what effect would the provisions of Sections 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 have on her right?
It is to be noted that this fact was undisputed that the properties in the suit were Ramasami Konar’s joint family property the first defendant had a share in and both parties in question were to be governed by the Mitakshara school of Hindu law.
After a thorough understanding of the arguments presented by both parties, the learned single judge of the High Court of Madras came to the conclusion that the view taken by both the previous courts could not be sustained. The High Court opined that the plaintiff cannot claim as the widow of the son and thus she could not claim one-half of the coparcenary property under the proviso of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It was held that she would be only entitled to a share if the deceased and the son had partitioned the property before death. The first defendant had not inherited any share from the deceased Ramasamy Konar and the plaintiff is only entitled to claim as a widow if there is a succession to Ramasamy Konar’s estate. If there was no succession that had occurred, the proviso of Section 6 which states that the first defendant is assumed to have passed away before Ramasamy Konar does not apply. Therefore, she cannot claim to be the widow of a predeceased son. Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is not applicable here.
The principles of justice, equity and public policy state that the plaintiff cannot be considered a new line of descent and the first defendant is to be treated as if he never existed. Since the plaintiff’s claim of the share in the property is based on the fact that she is the widow of the defendant and it is an undisputed fact that the first defendant is disqualified, this subsequently makes the plaintiff equally ineligible and disqualified because she cannot claim her share through her husband who was the murderer of the deceased. The High Court’s decision allowed the appeal made by the first defendant and the judgements along with the decrees of the Trial Court as well as the Lower Appellate Court were set aside.
The Supreme Court had two major issues at hand:
The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the appellant is the sole female survivor of the Joint Hindu family property since her husband was disqualified. Citing the proviso under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the counsel argued that she is entitled to the entire estate as the sole surviving member of the joint coparcenary property.
The learned counsel for the defendant submitted that the disqualification attached to the son due to him being the murderer of Ramasamy Konar equally applies to the wife of the son as she was claiming the right in the estate because of her marriage with the son.
The court throughout the judgement referred to several Sections of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. All the major relevant Sections have been briefed below for a thorough understanding.
Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is one of the most cited Sections in the case at hand. Section 6 was given a major overhaul and it was amended in 2005. To thoroughly understand the concept, the pre and post-amendment provisions of Section 6 have been briefed below. It is emphasised that the judgement pronounced in the case at hand was delivered prior to the 2005 amendment.
Before the amendment of 2005, Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 governed how coparcenary property within the Hindu joint family under the Mitakshara school of law would be passed down. Under this provision, the interest of a Hindu male in the joint coparcenary property upon his death would be transferred in accordance with the rule of survivorship. However, there existed an exception where if a deceased had a surviving female relative who is listed under Class I of the Schedule given in the Hindu Succession Act or there is a male relative specified in the same class who can claim through the female, in both these cases the interest would devolve via testamentary succession or intestate succession instead of rule of survivorship. There were two explanations attached to the old provision of Section 6.
Explanation 1: It created a legal scenario where the partition was considered to have taken place right before the death of the coparcener and entitled him to his share.
Explanation 2: It stated that those who had separated from the coparcenary before the deceased’s death could not claim any interest in the deceased’s property.
The amendment introduced by Act 39 of 2005 which took effect on 09 September 2005 brought substantial changes to Section 6.
The revised provided daughters the same rights as sons in coparcenary property within the joint family. It stated that from the date of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, the daughters in the family would by birth become coparceners with the same rights and liabilities as sons. This change was aimed at eliminating the gender discrimination which was present in the previous provision.
This amendment made a historic change and the rule of survivorship was abolished meaning that the property would no longer pass exclusively to male descendants but would be equally divided to all the coparceners and the rules of succession enshrined in the Hindu Succession Act would be followed for devolution of the property.
The proviso of this Section stated that any disposition or alienation of the property including any testamentary disposition occurring before 20 December 2004 would remain valid.
Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 states the general rules of succession for a male Hindu who dies intestate meaning without leaving a will or a testamentary document.
Rule 1: The property first goes to the heirs covered under Class I of the schedule given in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
Rule 2: If there are no Class I heirs, then it goes to the heirs listed in Class II of the Schedule.
Rule 3: If there are no heirs in either Class I or Class II, the property then devolves to the agnates of the deceased.
Rule 4: If there are no agnates of the deceased, the property goes to cognates.
Here the term “agnates” means a person related wholly through males either by blood or by adoption and the term “cognates” means where the person is related to the deceased through one or more female relations.
of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 states that a person who commits or aids in the commission of a murder is entirely disqualified from inheriting the property of the deceased victim or any other property related to the succession of the person they murdered or assisted in murdering.
of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 states that when an heir is disqualified from inheriting any property under this Act, the property will be distributed as if that person had predeceased the intestate that is the person dying without any will or testamentary document.
The judgement was penned by Justice A.K. Mathur. The Supreme Court at the very outset of the judgement cited several Sections of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, namely, Section 6, Section 8, Section 25 and Section 27, all of which have already been briefed under the heading “Laws discussed”.
According to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, if a male passes away after the Act has come into effect, his share in the Mitakshara coparcenary property is to be inherited by the remaining members of the coparcenary through the rule of survivorship and not by the rules of succession laid out in the Act. The Supreme Court observed that in the case at hand it has been established that the deceased, Ramasamy Konar is a Hindu and is governed in accordance with the Mitakshara school of Hindu law and the disputed suit property is part of the coparcenary property. However, he died intestate meaning the deceased died without making any testament or a will for further devolution of his property after his death.
Consequently, under the provisions of Section 6, the property should be inherited by the rule of survivorship by the remaining coparceners. However, there is an exception to this rule, if the deceased has left behind a female relative listed in Class I of the Schedule given in the Hindu Succession Act,1956 or a male relative listed in the same class of the schedule who claims through such a female, in these cases the deceased’s share in the Mitakshara property must be inherited through testamentary succession and not by survivorship.
The Supreme Court noted that the property in question has been confirmed by lower courts as coparcenary property. If the first defendant had not murdered his father, the situation might have been different. The bench went on to examine how the succession of the deceased father’s property is affected when the son is responsible for the father’s death. Had the son not committed the murder, he and his wife would have inherited the property. Under the Mitakshara school of Hindu law, a son gains an inherent interest in all the coparcenary property by virtue of birth or adoption regardless of whether the property is ancestral or self-acquired. This principle is widely recognised by scholars in the realm of Hindu law.
The court referred to several books by renowned authors while delivering this judgement. The court made a reference to Mulla, in the 15th Edition (1982), pages 284 to 285 which states that under the Mitakshara school of Hindu law, one of the major features of a coparcenary is shared ownership. The property is owned collectively by all the coparceners. In an undivided family, there is no single member who can claim a specific portion of the joint family property. Each member’s interest and share in the property changes with births and deaths in the family. A member upon partition gains a defined share in the property. The correct term for a coparcener’s stake in the property is “undivided coparcenary interest”. Until the said partition occurs, all the coparceners have collective rights to possess and enjoy the property. Mulla cited the case of Katama Natchair vs. The Rajah of Shivangunga (1863) wherein the privy council observed that all the family members share a common interest and possession. When one member dies, the surviving members inherit by survivorship, maintaining the shared interest and possession they had during the deceased member’s lifetime.
The court then cited , Volume 1, Third Edition (1981) on page 162 the author talks about the rights of coparceners and observes that until a partition takes place, a coparcener is entitled to 3 rights,
The Supreme Court referred to page 164 of the above-mentioned book where the author talks about the rule of survivorship. The author states that as long as a family remains united, the joint family property is inherited by the coparceners by the means of survivorship and not by the rule of succession. When a coparcener passes away, the remaining coparceners inherit his interest in the joint family property by the rule of survivorship. This is done to maintain the shared interest and possession all the coparceners enjoyed during the deceased’s lifetime. S.V. Gupta, the author of the book also notes that if a coparcener is disqualified from taking a share in the partition due to any disability, such as insanity they are still allowed to inherit the entire property as per the rules of survivorship. The court made a reference to page 165 of the book where the author states that once the deceased passes away and other coparceners inherit the property through survivorship, they do not become the legal representatives of the deceased. Survivorship simply increases the share of the coparceners in the property that they already collectively own.
The court made a reference to (8th Edition, 1987) on page 230, the author outlines a few rights given to coparceners which are briefed below:
Regarding the “Right by birth”, this can be drawn that every coparcener acquires an interest in the coparcenary property from birth and this right is retroactive to the date of conception but this does not negate the possibility that coparcenary property may come into existence after the coparcener is born.
In regard to the “Right of survivorship”, the court noted that the system of joint family with its principles of succession through survivorship is unique to Hindu law. In such a family, no members have a specific share and the death or exit of a member does not change the family’s joint status. If a coparcener dies without any male heirs, his interest in the joint family property passes to the coparceners by survivorship and not by succession to his own heirs. The court noted that if a coparcener becomes insane after birth, he does not lose his coparcenary status even though his condition might disqualify him from claiming his share in the partition. The court emphasised that the beneficial interest of each coparcener fluctuates, it increases with the death of another coparcener and decreases with the birth of a new one in the family. The court settled that the member of the coparcenary acquires a right in the joint family property as a coparcener by birth and his share may fluctuate from time to time depending on births and deaths in the family but his right by way of survivorship in coparcenary property is settled, regardless of the fluctuations.
The Supreme Court cited the case of where the principles of the Mitakshara school’s principles regarding the Hindu joint family property were discussed. According to the Mitakshara school of Hindu law, the property of a Hindu joint family is collectively owned by all coparceners in a quasi-corporate manner. The Mitakshara texts clearly state that the joint family property is held in trust for the benefit of all current and future family members. The Supreme Court in the Ghamandi Ram case listed a few characteristics of coparcenary under the Mitakshara school of Hindu law which are briefed below.
The Supreme Court made a reference to the case of the where the court elaborated on the concept of coparcenary given under the Mitakshara school of Hindu law. The court explained that coparcenary is related to joint family property where all coparceners share equally. However, a Hindu coparcenary is limited in scope as compared to a Hindu joint family. Only male members who gain an interest in joint or coparcenary property by birth can be coparceners. This group includes male members of a joint family, his sons, grandsons and great-grandsons. A coparcener has a right to the coparcenary property from birth itself, but this right and share in the property can only be precisely determined when a partition takes place. As long as the family remains joint, the share of a coparcener cannot be definitively fixed, as it is subject to change.
The court after going into thorough discussions about the concept of the Mitakshara school and the right of coparceners in the joint family property along with referring to a few judgements opined that the first defendant and the plaintiff who was married to the first defendant were members of a joint Hindu family. If the first defendant had not been disqualified, they would have inherited property according to the Mitakshara school. The issue at hand is whether the sole male survivor who has incurred disqualification can still claim the property under the Mitakshara law. If he cannot inherit the property by survivorship, the next question is whether his wife who would succeed through him, can claim the share in the coparcenary property. The Supreme Court answered in negative and denied the share to the wife.
The Court observed that even prior to the amendment made in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 when Section 25 and Section 27 did not exist. The stance of the law was the same and the person who had murdered his own father whose property they would have inherited was disqualified from inheriting the said property on the basis of principles of justice, equity, good conscience and public policy. The court now referred to a case of where the Lorships determined that a murderer is disqualified from inheritance and rejected any distinction between beneficial and legal estates under Hindu law. They held that such distinctions which were present in previous rulings of subordinate judges and Madras High Court in the case of will not be applicable. The privy council in the Kenchava Kom case (1924) also addressed whether inheritance could be claimed from the murderer and it was concluded that it could not. It was observed in the case that the murderer would be treated as non-existent for inheritance purposes, this was done to prevent the murderer from forming a new line of descent. The Privy Council ruled that a son who has murdered his father is entirely disinherited. They held that the murderer should be treated as if they were dead when the inheritance opened and excluded them from both legal and beneficial claims. The murderer can neither inherit the property nor can anyone claim it through them. This principle was later affirmed in several cases, namely, , , and .
The court observed that the legal principle where a person who commits or abets murder is disqualified from inheriting property was codified by Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which states that even if a murderer was not previously disqualified under traditional Hindu law, they are now disqualified on the basis of justice, equity and good conscience. According to these principles, a murderer should not be considered a starting point of a new line of descent after inheritance but rather they should be regarded as non-existent when the succession opens. The court established that if a person murders their father or any individual from whom they seek to inherit, they get completely disqualified from such inheritance. Now, Section 27 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 states that if a person is disqualified from inheriting under this Act they will be treated as if they have predeceased the deceased. This means that a person who has murdered someone from whom they wish is disqualified due to their actions, in such a case, they will be regarded as having died before the deceased.
The combined effect of Section 25 and Section 27 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is that a murderer is completely barred from inheriting the victim’s estate. The court made a reference to the objects and reasons wherein the framers of the Act cited the Privy Council’s decision and emphasised that a murderer should not be considered the starting point of a new line of descent but rather they should be regarded as non-existent. A person guilty of murder is treated as having no relationship to the deceased’s estate.
The court in the concluding remarks of the judgement referred to the facts of the present case and held that due to the effect of Sections 25 and 27, the first defendant cannot inherit any property of his father as he was murdered by the defendant himself. On the basis of principles of justice, equity and good conscience, the line of descent of the first defendant ceases to exist. Once the son himself is disqualified then his whole branch of coparcenary that is his son and his wife also ceases to be entitled to share in the property. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the judgement pronounced by the learned single judge of the High Court of Madras and held that the plaintiff is not entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased, Ramasamy Konar. The Court said that they cannot decide the share of the wife without first deciding the share of the son because the share of the wife flows through him. Since the son is not entitled to any share in the property of the deceased, the wife cannot also lay any claim on the deceased father-in-law’s property. The appeal was dismissed without any order as to the costs.
The Supreme Court in its judgement majorly referred to two judgments, namely, State Bank of India vs. Ghamandi Ram (1969) and State of Maharashtra vs. Narayan Rao Sham Deshmukh and Ors. (1985). Both of them have been briefed below for a thorough understanding.
State Bank of India vs. Ghamandi Ram (dead) through Shri Gurbax Rai revolves around a dispute between the State Bank of India (formerly known as the Imperial Bank of India) and Ghamandi Ram, who after his death represented by Shri Gubax Rai. The respondent Ghamandi Ram held a cash credit account in the Imperial Bank of India in Bhawalpur. The key issue in the case was the liability of the joint Hindu family for the debts incurred by the Karta that is Ghamandi Ram upon his death.
The legal question was whether the entire coparcenary was liable for the debts contracted by the Karta for a family business.
The Supreme Court in the case of Ghamndi Ram went into discussions about the nature of coparcenary under the Hindu law. A coparcenary consists of male members of a family who acquire a right by birth in the joint family property. The Karta is the manager of the coparcenary property and has the authority to contract debts for the family business and such debts are binding on the entire branch of coparcenary provided they are incurred for family purposes. The court held that debts incurred by Ghamandi Ram as the Karta of the joint family firm were binding on the entire coparcenary property and the joint family was liable to make repayments accordingly.
The case of State of Maharashtra vs. Narayan Rao Sham Deshmukh and Ors. (1985) involves Sham Rao Bhagwant Rao Deshmukh and his son Narayan Rao who were members of a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara school of law. Sham Rao’s wife Sulochanabai and his mother Gangabai were also members of this family. The family owned extensive properties which included agricultural lands. Upon Sham Rao’s death in 1957, his interest in the coparcenary property devolved equally to his son, wife and mother in accordance with Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. A notional partition assumed prior to his death determined the shares. Regardless of the partition, the family continued to live together and enjoy the properties as before.
In 1962, the came into force. Narayan Rao filed a declaration stating that the family held 305.49 acres of agricultural land and claimed a family arrangement divided the land into distinct shares. However, the Sub-Divisional Officer found the family was joint in estate and under the Ceiling Act, the family could not hold agricultural land exceeding one unit in the ceiling area and the family was entitled to retain only 96 acres where the remaining land was declared surplus and was to be surrendered in accordance with the Act. This decision was upheld by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal.
The High Court of Bombay concluded that upon Sham Rao’s death, the surviving members inherited their shares in the deceased property and thus ceased to hold the family property as joint family property. Each member was entitled to retain one unit ceiling area. The state government, aggrieved by this decision made an appeal and argued that the joint family continued and the family members collectively were entitled to only one unit of the ceiling area.
Whether the family continued to be joint in estate despite the notional partition and collectively held one unit of agricultural land under the Act.
The Supreme Court took a narrow approach and opined that the notional partition, although ascertained the shares of the members, did not disrupt the unity of the family and held that the Act would be applicable and all the family members collectively would be eligible to hold one unit only.
The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 introduced significant changes to ensure equality and gender neutrality in the laws governing joint family property and provided women rights and liabilities at par with men. In the present case, the issue at hand was whether a murderer is entitled to the coparcenary property of their victim. The court, rightly, answered in negative.
Even if this decision was made after the amendment came into effect, the outcome would have remained the same. Granting ancestral property rights to a murderer is fundamentally opposed to the principles of justice, equity and public policy which is the foundation of our legal system. Such a deviation would be a disheartening sight as it would contradict the very ideals our justice system stands on. This judgement reinforces the idea that the law must align with the broader values of society.
In conclusion, the judgement that was pronounced in the case of Vellikannu vs. R. Singaperumal and Ors. (2005), the Supreme Court of India addressed whether a murderer or someone claiming through the murderer is entitled to a share in the property of the deceased victim. The court decisively answered in negative and ruled that neither the murderer (the son) nor his wife (the person claiming through him) is entitled to any share in the property of the deceased. This judgement was a result of thorough discussions on the concept and nature of coparcenary as well as the incidents pertaining to a joint Hindu family.
According to the rule of survivorship, upon the death of a coparcener, their share in the property is distributed among the surviving coparceners and under this concept the share of each coparcener in the joint family property fluctuates depending on the deaths and births in the family. This rule was abolished in India when the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 came into effect on 09 September 2005.
There are majorly two schools of Hindu law, namely, Dayabhagha school and Mitakshara school. Both these schools have a contrary understanding of the concept of coparcenary. Mitakshara school states that coparcenary rights exist by birth and on the other hand, Dayabhaga school opines that coparcenary comes into existence only after the death of the last holder of the property.
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Introduction
The word “coparcenary” is a narrow institute and it majorly included male lineal descendants of a common ancestor. Prior to 2005, the rights and liabilities entitled to coparceners were restricted to just male members of a common ancestor till the third generation. This scenario was changed to make the traditional laws more gender-neutral and women were given rights in coparcenary property. The 2005 Amendment brought in another change and the concept of survivorship was abolished. Devolution of the property was now to be taken up by either testamentary succession or in accordance with the rules of succession enshrined under . This article deals with the facts, arguments advanced and judgement pronounced in the case of where the court went into deep discussions about the nature of coparcenary. It is emphasised that the which made major amendments to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was enacted on 09 September 2005 and the judgement in the case at hand was pronounced on 06 June 2005. The court has applied the rule of survivorship which is now abolished in India.
Details of the case
- Case Name: Vellikannu vs. R. Singaperumal and Ors. (2005)
- Petitioner: Vellikannu
- Respondents: R. Singaperumal and Ors.
- Court: The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
- Type and case no.: Civil Appeal No. 4838 of 1999
- Date of judgement: 06 June 2005
- Bench: Justice Ashok Bhan and Justice A.K Mathur
- Equivalent citations: [MANU/SC/0367/2005] [2005 INSC 267] [2005 (2) AWC 1905 (SC)]
- Provisions and Statutes involved: Sections , , and of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956
Facts of the case
The disputed properties are the self-acquired properties of Ramasami Konar and the first defendant in the case is his only son. The plaintiff is the son’s wife, meaning Ramasami Konar’s daughter-in-law. Ramasami Konar’s wife was divorced and already married someone else and was residing separately. On 10th October 1972, the first defendant that is the son murdered Ramasami Konar, his father and was convicted under of the which under the new criminal laws is equivalent to of . The son was convicted of the murder of Ramasami Konar and was given life imprisonment. Since the son had murdered the father, he was not entitled to any of the properties of the deceased father and the plaintiff who is the wife of the son claimed that she was entitled to the entire estate left by the deceased. The plaintiff citing Sections 25 and 27 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 contended that since the son was the murderer he was not entitled to the property and the property would be devolved in such a way that the son is presumed to be dead at the time of the partition and hence claimed to be the owner of all the properties. After the release of the son, the plaintiff and defendant lived together for some time before she was driven out of the house.
Trial Court
The plaintiff requested a declaration which would affirm her right in the deceased’s estate. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was not a legal heir of Ramasami Konar and that the suit was not maintainable. It was also alleged that all the properties acquired by Ramasami Konar were joint family property and the defendant will acquire them through the rule of survivorship.
The plaintiff sought a declaration to affirm her entitlement to the deceased’s estate. The defendant counter-argued that the plaintiff was not a legal heir of Ramasami Konar and that the suit was not maintainable. The defendant also claimed that all properties acquired by Ramasami Konar were joint family property which he would inherit through the rule of survivorship.
By the order dated 31 March 1980, the Trial Court held that the disputed property is joint family property and the first defendant is entitled to it and the second defendant is a cultivating tenant. However, the court also noted that the first defendant had murdered his father and therefore is not entitled to claim any rights under of the Hindu Succession Act, 1973 which is read with Sections 25 and 27 of the Act. All these Sections have been briefed in the later part of the article under the heading “Laws Discussed”. As per the proviso given in Section 6, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for half a share in the property and was granted the same.
Lower Appellate Court
Aggrieved by the Trial Court’s decision, the first defendant made an appeal to the Lower Appellate Court. The court upheld the Trial Court’s findings but modified the decree and treated it as a preliminary decree. The court determined that the first defendant should be considered non-existent and that the plaintiff as a class-I heir under of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is entitled to a share in the property. The appeal was subsequently dismissed.
High Court of Madras
Aggrieved by the decision of the Lower Appellate Court, the first defendant submitted a second appeal before the High Court of Madras. The High Court dealt with two major questions.
- Firstly, is the judgement labelled as “Ex. A.2” in the criminal case decisive in determining the issue of exclusion from inheritance in the ongoing proceedings?
- Secondly, whether the exclusion from inheritance would cover the enlargement of interest by the rule of survivorship in accordance with Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
For the first question, the High Court of Madras held that the judgement of the Criminal Court can be taken into consideration.
Moving on to the second question, which decided if the plaintiff is entitled to inherit the deceased father-in-law’s estate and what effect would the provisions of Sections 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 have on her right?
It is to be noted that this fact was undisputed that the properties in the suit were Ramasami Konar’s joint family property the first defendant had a share in and both parties in question were to be governed by the Mitakshara school of Hindu law.
After a thorough understanding of the arguments presented by both parties, the learned single judge of the High Court of Madras came to the conclusion that the view taken by both the previous courts could not be sustained. The High Court opined that the plaintiff cannot claim as the widow of the son and thus she could not claim one-half of the coparcenary property under the proviso of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It was held that she would be only entitled to a share if the deceased and the son had partitioned the property before death. The first defendant had not inherited any share from the deceased Ramasamy Konar and the plaintiff is only entitled to claim as a widow if there is a succession to Ramasamy Konar’s estate. If there was no succession that had occurred, the proviso of Section 6 which states that the first defendant is assumed to have passed away before Ramasamy Konar does not apply. Therefore, she cannot claim to be the widow of a predeceased son. Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is not applicable here.
The principles of justice, equity and public policy state that the plaintiff cannot be considered a new line of descent and the first defendant is to be treated as if he never existed. Since the plaintiff’s claim of the share in the property is based on the fact that she is the widow of the defendant and it is an undisputed fact that the first defendant is disqualified, this subsequently makes the plaintiff equally ineligible and disqualified because she cannot claim her share through her husband who was the murderer of the deceased. The High Court’s decision allowed the appeal made by the first defendant and the judgements along with the decrees of the Trial Court as well as the Lower Appellate Court were set aside.
Issue raised
The Supreme Court had two major issues at hand:
- whether the first defendant, who is the murderer in this case, is entitled to a share in the coparcenary property of the deceased victim.
- whether the plaintiff, who is the wife of the son and who would ideally claim through the son entitled to a right in the deceased father-in-law’s estate.
Arguments advanced by the parties
Appellants
The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the appellant is the sole female survivor of the Joint Hindu family property since her husband was disqualified. Citing the proviso under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the counsel argued that she is entitled to the entire estate as the sole surviving member of the joint coparcenary property.
Defendants
The learned counsel for the defendant submitted that the disqualification attached to the son due to him being the murderer of Ramasamy Konar equally applies to the wife of the son as she was claiming the right in the estate because of her marriage with the son.
Laws discussed
The court throughout the judgement referred to several Sections of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. All the major relevant Sections have been briefed below for a thorough understanding.
Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act
Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is one of the most cited Sections in the case at hand. Section 6 was given a major overhaul and it was amended in 2005. To thoroughly understand the concept, the pre and post-amendment provisions of Section 6 have been briefed below. It is emphasised that the judgement pronounced in the case at hand was delivered prior to the 2005 amendment.
Pre-amendment (Before 2005)
Before the amendment of 2005, Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 governed how coparcenary property within the Hindu joint family under the Mitakshara school of law would be passed down. Under this provision, the interest of a Hindu male in the joint coparcenary property upon his death would be transferred in accordance with the rule of survivorship. However, there existed an exception where if a deceased had a surviving female relative who is listed under Class I of the Schedule given in the Hindu Succession Act or there is a male relative specified in the same class who can claim through the female, in both these cases the interest would devolve via testamentary succession or intestate succession instead of rule of survivorship. There were two explanations attached to the old provision of Section 6.
Explanation 1: It created a legal scenario where the partition was considered to have taken place right before the death of the coparcener and entitled him to his share.
Explanation 2: It stated that those who had separated from the coparcenary before the deceased’s death could not claim any interest in the deceased’s property.
Post-amendment (After 2005)
The amendment introduced by Act 39 of 2005 which took effect on 09 September 2005 brought substantial changes to Section 6.
The revised provided daughters the same rights as sons in coparcenary property within the joint family. It stated that from the date of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, the daughters in the family would by birth become coparceners with the same rights and liabilities as sons. This change was aimed at eliminating the gender discrimination which was present in the previous provision.
This amendment made a historic change and the rule of survivorship was abolished meaning that the property would no longer pass exclusively to male descendants but would be equally divided to all the coparceners and the rules of succession enshrined in the Hindu Succession Act would be followed for devolution of the property.
The proviso of this Section stated that any disposition or alienation of the property including any testamentary disposition occurring before 20 December 2004 would remain valid.
Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act
Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 states the general rules of succession for a male Hindu who dies intestate meaning without leaving a will or a testamentary document.
Rule 1: The property first goes to the heirs covered under Class I of the schedule given in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
Rule 2: If there are no Class I heirs, then it goes to the heirs listed in Class II of the Schedule.
Rule 3: If there are no heirs in either Class I or Class II, the property then devolves to the agnates of the deceased.
Rule 4: If there are no agnates of the deceased, the property goes to cognates.
Here the term “agnates” means a person related wholly through males either by blood or by adoption and the term “cognates” means where the person is related to the deceased through one or more female relations.
Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act
of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 states that a person who commits or aids in the commission of a murder is entirely disqualified from inheriting the property of the deceased victim or any other property related to the succession of the person they murdered or assisted in murdering.
Section 27 of the Hindu Succession Act
of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 states that when an heir is disqualified from inheriting any property under this Act, the property will be distributed as if that person had predeceased the intestate that is the person dying without any will or testamentary document.
Judgement in Vellikannu vs. R. Singaperumal and Ors. (2005)
The judgement was penned by Justice A.K. Mathur. The Supreme Court at the very outset of the judgement cited several Sections of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, namely, Section 6, Section 8, Section 25 and Section 27, all of which have already been briefed under the heading “Laws discussed”.
According to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, if a male passes away after the Act has come into effect, his share in the Mitakshara coparcenary property is to be inherited by the remaining members of the coparcenary through the rule of survivorship and not by the rules of succession laid out in the Act. The Supreme Court observed that in the case at hand it has been established that the deceased, Ramasamy Konar is a Hindu and is governed in accordance with the Mitakshara school of Hindu law and the disputed suit property is part of the coparcenary property. However, he died intestate meaning the deceased died without making any testament or a will for further devolution of his property after his death.
Consequently, under the provisions of Section 6, the property should be inherited by the rule of survivorship by the remaining coparceners. However, there is an exception to this rule, if the deceased has left behind a female relative listed in Class I of the Schedule given in the Hindu Succession Act,1956 or a male relative listed in the same class of the schedule who claims through such a female, in these cases the deceased’s share in the Mitakshara property must be inherited through testamentary succession and not by survivorship.
The Supreme Court noted that the property in question has been confirmed by lower courts as coparcenary property. If the first defendant had not murdered his father, the situation might have been different. The bench went on to examine how the succession of the deceased father’s property is affected when the son is responsible for the father’s death. Had the son not committed the murder, he and his wife would have inherited the property. Under the Mitakshara school of Hindu law, a son gains an inherent interest in all the coparcenary property by virtue of birth or adoption regardless of whether the property is ancestral or self-acquired. This principle is widely recognised by scholars in the realm of Hindu law.
Rationale behind this judgement
The court referred to several books by renowned authors while delivering this judgement. The court made a reference to Mulla, in the 15th Edition (1982), pages 284 to 285 which states that under the Mitakshara school of Hindu law, one of the major features of a coparcenary is shared ownership. The property is owned collectively by all the coparceners. In an undivided family, there is no single member who can claim a specific portion of the joint family property. Each member’s interest and share in the property changes with births and deaths in the family. A member upon partition gains a defined share in the property. The correct term for a coparcener’s stake in the property is “undivided coparcenary interest”. Until the said partition occurs, all the coparceners have collective rights to possess and enjoy the property. Mulla cited the case of Katama Natchair vs. The Rajah of Shivangunga (1863) wherein the privy council observed that all the family members share a common interest and possession. When one member dies, the surviving members inherit by survivorship, maintaining the shared interest and possession they had during the deceased member’s lifetime.
The court then cited , Volume 1, Third Edition (1981) on page 162 the author talks about the rights of coparceners and observes that until a partition takes place, a coparcener is entitled to 3 rights,
- Joint possession and enjoyment of joint family property
- The right to claim a share in the joint family property as per the rule of survivorship
- The right to demand partition of the joint family property
The Supreme Court referred to page 164 of the above-mentioned book where the author talks about the rule of survivorship. The author states that as long as a family remains united, the joint family property is inherited by the coparceners by the means of survivorship and not by the rule of succession. When a coparcener passes away, the remaining coparceners inherit his interest in the joint family property by the rule of survivorship. This is done to maintain the shared interest and possession all the coparceners enjoyed during the deceased’s lifetime. S.V. Gupta, the author of the book also notes that if a coparcener is disqualified from taking a share in the partition due to any disability, such as insanity they are still allowed to inherit the entire property as per the rules of survivorship. The court made a reference to page 165 of the book where the author states that once the deceased passes away and other coparceners inherit the property through survivorship, they do not become the legal representatives of the deceased. Survivorship simply increases the share of the coparceners in the property that they already collectively own.
The court made a reference to (8th Edition, 1987) on page 230, the author outlines a few rights given to coparceners which are briefed below:
- Right by birth
- Right by survivorship
- Right to partition
- Right to joint possession and enjoyment
- Right to restrain unauthorised acts
- Right of alienation
- Right to accounts
- Right to make self-acquisition
Regarding the “Right by birth”, this can be drawn that every coparcener acquires an interest in the coparcenary property from birth and this right is retroactive to the date of conception but this does not negate the possibility that coparcenary property may come into existence after the coparcener is born.
In regard to the “Right of survivorship”, the court noted that the system of joint family with its principles of succession through survivorship is unique to Hindu law. In such a family, no members have a specific share and the death or exit of a member does not change the family’s joint status. If a coparcener dies without any male heirs, his interest in the joint family property passes to the coparceners by survivorship and not by succession to his own heirs. The court noted that if a coparcener becomes insane after birth, he does not lose his coparcenary status even though his condition might disqualify him from claiming his share in the partition. The court emphasised that the beneficial interest of each coparcener fluctuates, it increases with the death of another coparcener and decreases with the birth of a new one in the family. The court settled that the member of the coparcenary acquires a right in the joint family property as a coparcener by birth and his share may fluctuate from time to time depending on births and deaths in the family but his right by way of survivorship in coparcenary property is settled, regardless of the fluctuations.
The Supreme Court cited the case of where the principles of the Mitakshara school’s principles regarding the Hindu joint family property were discussed. According to the Mitakshara school of Hindu law, the property of a Hindu joint family is collectively owned by all coparceners in a quasi-corporate manner. The Mitakshara texts clearly state that the joint family property is held in trust for the benefit of all current and future family members. The Supreme Court in the Ghamandi Ram case listed a few characteristics of coparcenary under the Mitakshara school of Hindu law which are briefed below.
- The male descendants of a common ancestor up to the third generation automatically acquire ownership rights in the ancestral property from birth.
- These descendants have the liberty to assert their rights by requesting a partition at any time.
- Until a partition occurs, each coparcener has joint ownership over the entire property along with the other coparceners.
- This joint ownership means that possession and enjoyment of the coparcenary property is shared among all coparceners.
- The property cannot be alienated without the agreement and consent of all coparceners, except in the cases of necessity.
- When one coparcener dies, their interest in the coparcenary property is passed to the surviving coparceners in accordance with the rule of survivorship.
- The coparcenary under the Mitakshara school of Hindu law is created by law and cannot be formed by individuals by way of agreements, except in the case of adoptions where the adopted son becomes a part of the coparcenary concerning the ancestral properties of his adoptive father from the date of adoption.
The Supreme Court made a reference to the case of the where the court elaborated on the concept of coparcenary given under the Mitakshara school of Hindu law. The court explained that coparcenary is related to joint family property where all coparceners share equally. However, a Hindu coparcenary is limited in scope as compared to a Hindu joint family. Only male members who gain an interest in joint or coparcenary property by birth can be coparceners. This group includes male members of a joint family, his sons, grandsons and great-grandsons. A coparcener has a right to the coparcenary property from birth itself, but this right and share in the property can only be precisely determined when a partition takes place. As long as the family remains joint, the share of a coparcener cannot be definitively fixed, as it is subject to change.
The court after going into thorough discussions about the concept of the Mitakshara school and the right of coparceners in the joint family property along with referring to a few judgements opined that the first defendant and the plaintiff who was married to the first defendant were members of a joint Hindu family. If the first defendant had not been disqualified, they would have inherited property according to the Mitakshara school. The issue at hand is whether the sole male survivor who has incurred disqualification can still claim the property under the Mitakshara law. If he cannot inherit the property by survivorship, the next question is whether his wife who would succeed through him, can claim the share in the coparcenary property. The Supreme Court answered in negative and denied the share to the wife.
The Court observed that even prior to the amendment made in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 when Section 25 and Section 27 did not exist. The stance of the law was the same and the person who had murdered his own father whose property they would have inherited was disqualified from inheriting the said property on the basis of principles of justice, equity, good conscience and public policy. The court now referred to a case of where the Lorships determined that a murderer is disqualified from inheritance and rejected any distinction between beneficial and legal estates under Hindu law. They held that such distinctions which were present in previous rulings of subordinate judges and Madras High Court in the case of will not be applicable. The privy council in the Kenchava Kom case (1924) also addressed whether inheritance could be claimed from the murderer and it was concluded that it could not. It was observed in the case that the murderer would be treated as non-existent for inheritance purposes, this was done to prevent the murderer from forming a new line of descent. The Privy Council ruled that a son who has murdered his father is entirely disinherited. They held that the murderer should be treated as if they were dead when the inheritance opened and excluded them from both legal and beneficial claims. The murderer can neither inherit the property nor can anyone claim it through them. This principle was later affirmed in several cases, namely, , , and .
The court observed that the legal principle where a person who commits or abets murder is disqualified from inheriting property was codified by Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which states that even if a murderer was not previously disqualified under traditional Hindu law, they are now disqualified on the basis of justice, equity and good conscience. According to these principles, a murderer should not be considered a starting point of a new line of descent after inheritance but rather they should be regarded as non-existent when the succession opens. The court established that if a person murders their father or any individual from whom they seek to inherit, they get completely disqualified from such inheritance. Now, Section 27 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 states that if a person is disqualified from inheriting under this Act they will be treated as if they have predeceased the deceased. This means that a person who has murdered someone from whom they wish is disqualified due to their actions, in such a case, they will be regarded as having died before the deceased.
The combined effect of Section 25 and Section 27 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is that a murderer is completely barred from inheriting the victim’s estate. The court made a reference to the objects and reasons wherein the framers of the Act cited the Privy Council’s decision and emphasised that a murderer should not be considered the starting point of a new line of descent but rather they should be regarded as non-existent. A person guilty of murder is treated as having no relationship to the deceased’s estate.
The court in the concluding remarks of the judgement referred to the facts of the present case and held that due to the effect of Sections 25 and 27, the first defendant cannot inherit any property of his father as he was murdered by the defendant himself. On the basis of principles of justice, equity and good conscience, the line of descent of the first defendant ceases to exist. Once the son himself is disqualified then his whole branch of coparcenary that is his son and his wife also ceases to be entitled to share in the property. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the judgement pronounced by the learned single judge of the High Court of Madras and held that the plaintiff is not entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased, Ramasamy Konar. The Court said that they cannot decide the share of the wife without first deciding the share of the son because the share of the wife flows through him. Since the son is not entitled to any share in the property of the deceased, the wife cannot also lay any claim on the deceased father-in-law’s property. The appeal was dismissed without any order as to the costs.
Precedents referred to in Vellikannu vs. R. Singaperumal and Ors. (2005)
The Supreme Court in its judgement majorly referred to two judgments, namely, State Bank of India vs. Ghamandi Ram (1969) and State of Maharashtra vs. Narayan Rao Sham Deshmukh and Ors. (1985). Both of them have been briefed below for a thorough understanding.
State Bank of India vs. Ghamandi Ram (1969)
Facts
State Bank of India vs. Ghamandi Ram (dead) through Shri Gurbax Rai revolves around a dispute between the State Bank of India (formerly known as the Imperial Bank of India) and Ghamandi Ram, who after his death represented by Shri Gubax Rai. The respondent Ghamandi Ram held a cash credit account in the Imperial Bank of India in Bhawalpur. The key issue in the case was the liability of the joint Hindu family for the debts incurred by the Karta that is Ghamandi Ram upon his death.
Issue
The legal question was whether the entire coparcenary was liable for the debts contracted by the Karta for a family business.
Judgement
The Supreme Court in the case of Ghamndi Ram went into discussions about the nature of coparcenary under the Hindu law. A coparcenary consists of male members of a family who acquire a right by birth in the joint family property. The Karta is the manager of the coparcenary property and has the authority to contract debts for the family business and such debts are binding on the entire branch of coparcenary provided they are incurred for family purposes. The court held that debts incurred by Ghamandi Ram as the Karta of the joint family firm were binding on the entire coparcenary property and the joint family was liable to make repayments accordingly.
State of Maharashtra vs. Narayan Rao Sham Rao Deshmukh and Ors. (1985)
Facts
The case of State of Maharashtra vs. Narayan Rao Sham Deshmukh and Ors. (1985) involves Sham Rao Bhagwant Rao Deshmukh and his son Narayan Rao who were members of a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara school of law. Sham Rao’s wife Sulochanabai and his mother Gangabai were also members of this family. The family owned extensive properties which included agricultural lands. Upon Sham Rao’s death in 1957, his interest in the coparcenary property devolved equally to his son, wife and mother in accordance with Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. A notional partition assumed prior to his death determined the shares. Regardless of the partition, the family continued to live together and enjoy the properties as before.
In 1962, the came into force. Narayan Rao filed a declaration stating that the family held 305.49 acres of agricultural land and claimed a family arrangement divided the land into distinct shares. However, the Sub-Divisional Officer found the family was joint in estate and under the Ceiling Act, the family could not hold agricultural land exceeding one unit in the ceiling area and the family was entitled to retain only 96 acres where the remaining land was declared surplus and was to be surrendered in accordance with the Act. This decision was upheld by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal.
The High Court of Bombay concluded that upon Sham Rao’s death, the surviving members inherited their shares in the deceased property and thus ceased to hold the family property as joint family property. Each member was entitled to retain one unit ceiling area. The state government, aggrieved by this decision made an appeal and argued that the joint family continued and the family members collectively were entitled to only one unit of the ceiling area.
Issue
Whether the family continued to be joint in estate despite the notional partition and collectively held one unit of agricultural land under the Act.
Judgement
The Supreme Court took a narrow approach and opined that the notional partition, although ascertained the shares of the members, did not disrupt the unity of the family and held that the Act would be applicable and all the family members collectively would be eligible to hold one unit only.
Analysis of the case
The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 introduced significant changes to ensure equality and gender neutrality in the laws governing joint family property and provided women rights and liabilities at par with men. In the present case, the issue at hand was whether a murderer is entitled to the coparcenary property of their victim. The court, rightly, answered in negative.
Even if this decision was made after the amendment came into effect, the outcome would have remained the same. Granting ancestral property rights to a murderer is fundamentally opposed to the principles of justice, equity and public policy which is the foundation of our legal system. Such a deviation would be a disheartening sight as it would contradict the very ideals our justice system stands on. This judgement reinforces the idea that the law must align with the broader values of society.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the judgement that was pronounced in the case of Vellikannu vs. R. Singaperumal and Ors. (2005), the Supreme Court of India addressed whether a murderer or someone claiming through the murderer is entitled to a share in the property of the deceased victim. The court decisively answered in negative and ruled that neither the murderer (the son) nor his wife (the person claiming through him) is entitled to any share in the property of the deceased. This judgement was a result of thorough discussions on the concept and nature of coparcenary as well as the incidents pertaining to a joint Hindu family.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
What is the rule of survivorship?
According to the rule of survivorship, upon the death of a coparcener, their share in the property is distributed among the surviving coparceners and under this concept the share of each coparcener in the joint family property fluctuates depending on the deaths and births in the family. This rule was abolished in India when the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 came into effect on 09 September 2005.
What are the major schools of Hindu law?
There are majorly two schools of Hindu law, namely, Dayabhagha school and Mitakshara school. Both these schools have a contrary understanding of the concept of coparcenary. Mitakshara school states that coparcenary rights exist by birth and on the other hand, Dayabhaga school opines that coparcenary comes into existence only after the death of the last holder of the property.
References
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