Introduction
Section of the (Arbitration Act/the Act) was introduced by way of the (2015 Amendment Act) . The provision provides for a specific timeline for the completion of the arbitral proceedings and rendering of the arbitral award. It also provides that the courts may grant an extension for rendering the award provided sufficient cause is shown in that regard.
The original provision in the 2015 Amendment Act set a 12-months deadline for completing arbitral proceedings from the date when the Tribunal enters the reference in the matter. However, this timeline was found to be overly ambitious in the Indian context. Consequently, the (2019 Amendment Act) was introduced. The 2019 Amendment Act, in essence, provided a further six-month period by requiring the 12 months under Section 29-A(1) to be counted from the date of completion of pleadings. The extracts of the relevant clause pre and post the 2019 Amendment Act under Section 29-A are set out hereinbelow:
| 2015 Amendment Act | 2019 Amendment Act |
| (1) The award shall be made within a period of twelve months from the date the Arbitral Tribunal enters upon the reference. Explanation.― For the purpose of this sub-section, an Arbitral Tribunal shall be deemed to have entered upon the reference on the date on which the arbitrator or all the arbitrators, as the case may be, have received notice, in writing, of their appointment. | (1) The award in matters other than international commercial arbitration shall be made by the Arbitral Tribunal within a period of twelve months from the date of completion of pleadings under sub-section (4) of Section 23…. |
Although, Section 29-A was introduced with the object of imparting timeliness and certainty to the arbitral process, it has long been plagued by interpretation-related issues. This suggests that the provision was not originally drafted with the necessary clarity. In this article, we delve into two major propositions and try to answer them by referring to the prevailing judicial trends. Firstly, we examine which court has the jurisdiction and powers to extend the mandate of an Arbitral Tribunal under Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act. Secondly, we examine whether the mandate of an Arbitral Tribunal can be extended only prior to or even after the expiry of the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal.
Which court has the jurisdiction to the Act under Section 29-A?
(a) Delhi High Court
In DDA v. Tara Chand Sumit Construction Co. , a petition under Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act was filed before the Delhi High Court which came to be opposed on the grounds of maintainability. The respondent in the case contended that the petition under Section 29-A would only be maintainable before the District Court.
The Delhi High Court examined the definition of the term “court” as provided in Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act and opined that if one were to look into the definition, it would seem plausible that the power to extend the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal would lie with the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction in a district. However, upon a careful analysis, the Delhi High Court opined that such an interpretation would lead to complications and would fall in the teeth of the powers of the courts under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act. Thus, the Delhi High Court noted that the moot question is whether the term “court” can be interpreted differently in the context of Sections 29-A and 11 of the Arbitration Act. As per the Delhi High Court, Section 2(1) of the Arbitration Act itself answered the moot point, as it began with the expression, “In this part, unless the context otherwise requires”.
The Delhi High Court opined that the power to extend the mandate of an arbitrator did not pose a difficulty until the question of substituting an Arbitral Tribunal initially appointed by the High Court, or the Supreme Court under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act came into play. The Delhi High Court observed that the only way this conflict could be resolved or reconciled was by interpreting the term “court” in the context of Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act to be a court which has the power to appoint an Arbitral Tribunal under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act. The Delhi High Court concluded that in cases where the Arbitral Tribunal is appointed under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, an application under Section 29-A seeking the extension of the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal would only be maintainable before the same court which dealt with the application under Section 11 in the first place.
(b) Bombay High Court
In Indicus Software (P) Ltd. v. Infinite Uptime India (P) Ltd. , an objection was raised to the effect that in terms of a catena of decisions , the Bombay High Court lacked the requisite jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act. The respondent argued that proceedings under Section 29-A ought to have been filed before the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction, which, as per the respondent, was the District Court at Pune. In its analysis, the Bombay High Court at first referred to the decision in Cabra Instalaciones Y. Servicios, SA v. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. to reiterate the view that in cases where the Arbitral Tribunal was appointed consequent to the passing of an order under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, a proceeding seeking extension of the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act should lie before the same court which passed the order under Section 11.
In Cabra Instalaciones case , the appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act was made by the Supreme Court of India, given that the proposed arbitration constituted an international commercial arbitration under Section 2(1)(f) of the Arbitration Act. In such cases, as per the Bombay High Court, a petition under Section 29-A ought to have been preferred before the Supreme Court itself.
The Bombay High Court in Indicus case also referred to the decision in DDA case to hold that the Delhi High Court also took a similar view as that of the Bombay High Court and reiterated that when the High Court appoints an Arbitral Tribunal in an application filed under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, an application under Section 29-A seeking extension of the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal ought to be filed before the said High Court.
Speaking of cases where the appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal is not made under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, the Bombay High Court referred to the decision in Magnum Opus IT Consulting (P) Ltd. v. Artcad Systems wherein the arbitration was invoked in terms of the provisions of the . In Magnum case , given that the appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal was not made under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, the Bombay High Court found that an application seeking an extension of the mandate of the Arbitration Tribunal under Section 29-A would lie before the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction i.e. the District Court at Nashik.
In another case in K.I.P.L. Vistacore Infra Projects JV v. Municipal Corpn., Ichalkarnji , the Bombay High Court was faced with a similar challenge to the maintainability of a petition under Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act. The Bombay High Court reviewed the meaning of the word “court” as per the amended provisions of Section 2(1)(e) and opined that a reading of the aforesaid definition would clearly indicate that in domestic arbitrations, Court means the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction in a district and includes the High Court which exercises its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. It was also noted that Section 2(1) begins with the words, “In this part, unless context otherwise requires….”
The Bombay High Court in K.I.P.L. case then referred to the decisions in Cabra Instalaciones case and DDA case to hold that an anomalous situation would arise if an Arbitral Tribunal appointed by the High Court or Supreme Court under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act is permitted to be substituted by the Principal Civil Court under Section 29-A. Thus, the Bombay High Court sided with the understanding presented by its earlier decisions in Cabra Instalaciones case and Indicus case .
The Bombay High Court in Indicus case and K.I.P.L. case created a dichotomy between cases based on whether or not the initial appointments of the Arbitral Tribunal were made under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act. In cases where the appointment is made under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, the Bombay High Court subscribes to the view that the extension of the mandate under Section 29-A must also be done by the same court i.e. the High Court in case of domestic arbitrations, and the Supreme Court in case of international commercial arbitrations as defined under Section 2(1)(f) of the Arbitration Act.
In Sheela Chowgule v. Vijay V. Chowgule , the question of which court is the “Court” in terms of Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act arose once again. The petitioner submitted that the power to extend the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act only lies with the High Court and not before the Commercial Court or even the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction for the simple reason that once the Arbitral Tribunal is appointed by the High Court, only the High Court will have power to regulate the proceedings including Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act.
The Bombay High Court in Sheela Chowgule case , upon examining the decisions relied upon by both sides, observed that it was clear that there were divergent views in connection with the interpretation of Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act, more particularly on the aspect of what is meant by the term “Court” in context of Section 29-A. The Bombay High Court observed that there cannot be any difference with regard to the procedure adopted in the appointment and substitution/reconstitution of an arbitrator. The words used in Section 29-A(7) specifically provide the word “appointed under this section”. Thus, as per the Bombay High Court, substitution is, in fact, a fresh appointment as otherwise contemplated under Section 11 of the said Act. The Bombay High Court held that in order to avoid any conflict in the authority vested in courts under Sections 11 and 29-A of the Arbitration Act, the power to substitute or reconstitute the Arbitral Tribunal as provided under Section 29-A(6) will have to be read together with Section 11 which deals with appointment of arbitrators. Ultimately, given the divergent views on the subject, the Bombay High Court referred the matter to a larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement.
(c) Allahabad High Court
In Lucknow Agencies v. U.P. Avas Vikas Parishad , the Allahabad High Court while considering a petition under Section 29-A held that given the fact that the arbitrator in this case was not appointed by the High Court under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, and that the Allahabad High Court does not exercise ordinary original civil jurisdiction, it would not have the power to hear and decide an application under Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act and the same would have to be filed before the Principal Civil Court concerned.
As such, the decision in Lucknow Agencies case did not deal with a situation wherein the arbitrator was appointed in terms of the powers contained in Section 11 of the Arbitration Act. Thus, the angle of the potential conflict between the powers vested under Sections 11 and 29-A remained untouched in Lucknow Agencies case .
In Indian Farmers Fertilisers Coop. Ltd. v. Manish Engg. Enterprises , the issue of the potential conflict between the powers under Sections 11 and 29-A of the Arbitration Act was first taken up by the Allahabad High Court. The Allahabad High Court clarified that in cases where an Arbitral Tribunal was appointed by the High Court in exercise of the powers vested under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, it is only the High Court which would have the power to grant a time extension to the Arbitral Tribunal for making the award under Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act.
Subsequently, in A’Xykno Capital Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. , the Allahabad High Court took a divergent view, holding that the judgment in Indian Farmers Fertilisers case could not be considered a binding precedent. It was further held that irrespective of who appointed the arbitrator, it is only the Court as defined under Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act that can entertain an application under Section 29-A of the Act.
Subsequently, the Allahabad High Court in Jaypee Infratech Ltd. v. EHBH Services (P) Ltd. , commenting upon the decision in A’Xykno Capital Services case , opined that the reasoning therein would lead to a situation wherein, although not intended by the legislature, the power of substitution under Section 29-A(6) would be bestowed upon the Court as defined under Section 2(1)(e) even when the initial appointment of the arbitrator(s) may have been made under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act by the High Courts or the Supreme Court. The Allahabad High Court observed that each provision in the Arbitration Act is required to be interpreted in the context under which it has been used. As such, literal rule of interpretation is not the only rule of interpretation especially when a literal interpretation goes against the principle of judicial hierarchy.
Given the divergence in the views taken by various High Courts, the Allahabad High Court referred the matter to a larger Bench.
(d) Calcutta High Court
In Geo Miller & Co. (P) Ltd. v. U.P. Jal Nigam , the Calcutta High Court placed complete reliance on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Jaypee Infratech case , to hold that there existed a clear conflict between Sections 11 and 29-A of the Arbitration Act. The Calcutta High Court sided with the understanding presented in Jaypee Infratech case . Considering the different interpretations given by different courts on this issue, the Calcutta High Court also decided to refer the matter to a larger Bench.
(e) Kerala High Court
In URC Construction (P) Ltd. v. BEML Ltd. , the Kerala High Court was faced with the question as to which Court would have the jurisdiction to exercise the powers under Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act. The Kerala High Court referred to the definition of the term “Court” in Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act and held that the term “court” meant the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction in a district, and the High Court which exercises ordinary original jurisdiction. Since, the Kerala High Court did not have original jurisdiction, it held that it would not fall under the definition of a Court under Section 2(1)(e). Accordingly, a petition filed under Section 29-A came to be dismissed as not maintainable. The petitioner in this case was left at liberty to approach the relevant court.
In Lots Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Cochin Port Trust , a decision Bench while dealing with the decision rendered in URC Construction case opined that the term “Court” used in Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act has to be given a contextual and purposive interpretation, which must be in variance with the meaning conferred in Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act. The term “court” in Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act has to be interpreted as the Supreme Court in the case of international commercial arbitrations and as the High Court in domestic arbitrations.
(f) Orissa High Court
In Dredging & Desiltation Co. (P) Ltd. v. Paradip Port Trust , the Orissa High Courtdealt with a common question of law arising out of a batch of matters concerning the interpretation of the word “court” under Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act. At the outset, the Orissa High Court opined that contextual interpretation was a well-accepted tool for the interpretation of statutes, even in absence of any such prescription in the statute. In this regard, the Orissa High Court placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in RBI v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. which held that an interpretation is best when it makes the text match the context.
The Orissa High Court first referred to the decision of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in South Bihar Power Distribution Co. Ltd. v. Bhagalpur Electricity Distribution Co. (P) Ltd. The Patna High Court in the said decision sided with the theory that there arises a conflict when a substitution of the Arbitral Tribunal is prayed for before the Principal Civil Court when the initial appointment was done by the High Court under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act. Accordingly, the Patna High Court opined that the Principal Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain applications for extension of mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal. In arriving at its conclusion, the Patna High Court placed reliance on the decisions in Cabra Instalaciones case and Indian Farmers Fertilisers case .
The Orissa High Court, in Dredging & Desiltation case then referred to the decisions in K.I.P.L. case and DDA case and opined that the said decisions also followed a similar approach to hold that there exists a conflict between the powers vested under Sections 29-A and 11 of the Arbitration Act if a court was understood to be the Principal Civil Court in terms of Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act. The only walkaround this was the use of the expression “unless the context otherwise requires” in Section 2(1) of the Arbitration Act.
The Orissa High Court observed that previously, two separate Coordinate Bench decisions in KCS (P) Ltd. v. Rosy Enterprises and Liladitya Deb v. Tara Ranjan Pattanaik had held undertaken a plain interpretation of Section 29-A read with Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act to hold that a petition under Section 29-A would be maintainable before a High Court exercising original jurisdiction.
Since, the Orissa High Court in Dredging & Desiltation case did not agree with the understanding presented by the Coordinate Benches in KCS (P) Ltd. case and Liladitya Deb case , the Orissa High Court referred the matter to a larger Bench.
(g) The case before the Supreme Court of India — A missed opportunity?
In State of Meghalaya v. BSC-C & C (JV) , the Meghalaya High Court while deciding the moot point i.e. what is meant by the term “court” in Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act rendered the following findings:
The term “court” used in Section 29-A(4) as the definitions clause has also provided in Section 2(1)(e) is to be interpreted by making use of the expression “unless the context otherwise requires”. This provision, enable courts to consider the broader context, including the intent of the legislature, in determining the applicable meaning of the provisions at hand. In essence, it grants discretion to interpret the provision in a manner that best aligns with the overall purpose and objectives of the statute.
If the power under Section 29-A is to be exercised by the Principal Civil Court, though it may be competent to extend the mandate, an anomalous situation would arise, if there is a question of substitution, as it may result in an arbitrator appointed by the High Court being substituted by the Principal Civil Court, which would then militate against the stipulation of Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act.
As such, Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act allows the interpretation of the term “Court” to be read, keeping the object of the statute intact, and the same should not result in defeating the purpose, for which the provision i.e. Section 29-A was inserted.
A distinction can be drawn to hold that, if the appointment of the arbitrator is not by the
High Court under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction will have the power to entertain an application under Section 29-A for extension of the term, as no anomalous situation would arise therefrom.
The aforesaid decision was sought to be challenged in a petition for special leave to appeal filed before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court opined that the power under Section 29-A(4) of the Arbitration Act vests in the Court as defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act. It is the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction in a district which includes a High Court provided the same has ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The Supreme Court while accepting the finding of the Meghalaya High Court reiterated that since the Meghalaya High Court did not have the ordinary original civil jurisdiction, an application under Section 29-A ought to have been before the Commercial Court at Shillong, East Khasi Hills. Accordingly, the special leave petition was dismissed.
The Supreme Court did not address the detailed findings of the Meghalaya High Court regarding the potential conflict of powers vested in courts under Sections 11(6) and 29-A(4) of the Arbitration Act. Consequently, despite the Supreme Court’s ruling that the term “court” in Section 29-A refers to the Court as defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act, the debate over the friction between Sections 11 and 29-A(4) remains unresolved.
When can a court extend the mandate of an Arbitral Tribunal under Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act?
The issue of whether an extension of the mandate of an Arbitral Tribunal can be granted under Section 29-A(5) of the Arbitration Act after the mandate expired has been addressed in numerous decisions by various High Courts:
(a) Delhi High Court
The Delhi High Court has examined the issue of extending the mandate of an Arbitral Tribunal under Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act in cases like Wadia Techno-Engg. Services Ltd. v. Director General of Married Accommodation Project and ATC Telecom Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. BSNL . These rulings determined that the mandate could be extended either before or after the expiration of the specified period. This interpretation has been upheld in various other decisions of the Delhi High Court.
Deviating from the aforementioned line of judgments, the Delhi High Court in Shapoorji Pallonji and Co. (P) Ltd. v. Elena Power and Infrastructure Ltd. , held that the parties can only invoke Section 29-A(4) of the Arbitration Act after the period specified under Section 29-A(3) has been exhausted. In a subsequent decision in Power Mech Projects Ltd. v. Doosan Power Systems India (P) Ltd. , the Delhi High Court upon considering the existing judicial precedents on the issue sided with the interpretation that the in view of the expression used in Section 29-A(4) of the Arbitration Act reading, “prior to or after expiry of the period so specified”, a court acting under Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act would be fully empowered to extend the mandate of an Arbitral Tribunal. In this regard, the Delhi High Court reiterated the following observations of the Bombay High Court in Nikhil H Malkan v. Standard Chartered Investment and Loans (India) Ltd. , which are culled out hereinbelow:
15. Having perused Section 29-A(4) of the said Act, particularly in the light of use of the words “either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified”, this Court finds that the purpose for which Section 29-A was introduced in the aforesaid Act would be defeated, if it is to be held that the Court could exercise power to extend the mandate of the learned arbitrator even after expiry of the extended period only if the application or petition for extension of mandate is filed prior to expiry of such mandate. There is nothing in the provision to indicate that if such an application or petition is not filed before the expiry of the mandate of the learned arbitrator, the Court would be rendered powerless to exercise its authority. The aforesaid provision i.e. Section 29-A of the aforesaid Act, is a provision that enables the Court to pass appropriate orders in order to ensure that the arbitral proceeding reaches its logical conclusion. No purpose would be served in holding that if such an application or petition for extension of mandate of the learned arbitrator is filed after the expiry of the mandate, the Court would be in no position to entertain the same. Any apprehension regarding inordinate and unexplained delay on the part of the party approaching the Court can be addressed by holding that the Court would extend the mandate only when it is satisfied that sufficient grounds are made out for granting extension of mandate of the learned arbitrator.
(b) Calcutta High Court
The Calcutta High Court, in Rohan Builders (India) (P) Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd. , held that the mandate of an Arbitral Tribunal ends automatically if the award is not delivered within the time limits specified in Section 29-A(1) or Section 29-A(3) of the Arbitration Act. Consequently, post-expiry petitions for extension under Section 29-A(4) are not permissible, as the Tribunal’s mandate cannot be revived. This interpretation was supported by the language in Section 29-A(5) which uses the term “terminate” as opposed to “revival” or “renewal”.
In Vrindavan Advisory Services LLP v. Deep Shambulal Bhanushali , the Calcutta High Court reaffirmed the stance taken in Rohan Builders case . Both decisions were subsequently challenged before the Supreme Court, which stayed the said judgments pending further review.
In another recent decision, Multiplex Equipments and Services (P) Ltd. v. Bagzone Lifestyles (P) Ltd. , the Calcutta High Court noted that the pending Supreme Court litigation should not disadvantage the petitioner, and arbitration proceedings should not be stalled.
(c) Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court
In H.P. Singh v. Northern Railways , the Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court ruled that it has the authority to extend the mandate of an Arbitral Tribunal beyond the initial and extended periods specified in Section 29-A(4). The High Court referred to the decision in ATC Telecom case to support its ruling instead of the decision in Rohan Builders case .
(d) Kerala High Court
The Kerala High Court, in Hiran Valiiyakkil Lal v. Vineeth M.V. , held that under Section 29-A(4) the mandate of an Arbitral Tribunal can be extended before or after the expiry of the periods specified in Sections 29-A(2) and (3) given sufficient cause and subject to terms set by the Court.
(e) Madras High Court
In Suryadev Alloys and Power (P) Ltd. v. Govindaraja Textiles (P) Ltd. , the Madras High Court echoed the view that the Court can grant an extension for issuing the award even after the periods specified in Section 29-A(1) or Section 29-A(3) have lapsed. However, once the award is passed, the mandate cannot be extended under Section 34.
(f) Bombay High Court
The Bombay High Court, in Nikhil H. Malkan v. Standard Chartered Investment and Loans (India) Ltd. , aligned with the decision in ATC Telecom case , stating that the Court retains the power to extend the mandate of an arbitrator even if the extension petition is filed after the mandate has expired.
Conclusion
Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act, introduced by the 2015 Amendment Act and subsequently refined by the 2019 Amendment Act, was designed to instil a sense of timeliness and efficiency in the arbitration process in India. However, its implementation has not been without challenges. This article has examined two critical issues, the jurisdiction of courts under Section 29-A and the appropriate stage of seeking an extension of the Arbitral Tribunal’s mandate.
Firstly, regarding jurisdiction, various High Courts have offered divergent interpretations. The Delhi High Court as well as the Bombay High Court have primarily maintained that in cases where the Arbitral Tribunal is appointed under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, the same Court that made the appointment should handle any requests under Section 29-A. This view aims to prevent jurisdictional conflicts and ensure procedural consistency. The Allahabad, Calcutta, Kerala, and Orissa High Courts have similarly navigated this complex issue. Most of the High Courts have referred matters to larger Benches due to the lack of consensus. These varying interpretations highlight the necessity for a clear, authoritative pronouncement to harmonise the application of Section 29-A across jurisdictions.
The proceedings before the Supreme Court of India in State of Meghalaya v. BSC-C & C (JV) presented a significant opportunity to address jurisdictional ambiguities in Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act, particularly regarding the interpretation of the term “Court”. While, the Supreme Court affirmed that the power under Section 29-A(4) of the Arbitration Act vests in the Court as defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, the Supreme Court did not address the detailed findings of the Meghalaya High Court regarding the potential conflict of powers vested in courts under Sections 11(6) and 29-A(4) of the Arbitration Act. Consequently, the debate over the friction between Sections 11 and 29-A(4) remains unresolved.
Secondly, on the issue of the appropriate stage to file an application under Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act, courts have again differed. The Delhi High Court and others, including the Bombay High Court and Kerala High Court, have held that the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal can be extended either before or after the expiration of the initially prescribed period, emphasising upon the intent to ensure that arbitral proceedings reach their logical conclusion. Conversely, the Calcutta High Court has taken a stricter approach, asserting that post-expiry extensions are impermissible. This strict interpretation aims to uphold the statutory timelines but risks undermining the flexibility required in arbitration.
The examination of these judicial trends brings out the complexities and ambiguities inherent in Section 29-A of the Arbitration Act. The divergence in judicial interpretations calls for legislative clarification or a definitive ruling by the Supreme Court to ensure uniformity and predictability in arbitration proceedings in India. By addressing these issues comprehensively, the legal framework can better serve its purpose of providing an efficient and reliable arbitration process, ultimately bolstering the credibility and attractiveness of India as a hub for arbitration.
*Founder and Head of Trinity Chambers, Delhi.
**Counsel at Trinity Chambers, Delhi.
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Cabra Instalaciones Y. Servicios, SA v. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd., ; and Magnum Opus IT Consulting (P) Ltd. v. Artcad Systems, .
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The matter pertained to the pre-2015 Amendment Act version of S. 2(1)(e). However, there is no significant change in the current legal provisions.
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W.P. (C) No. 25344 of 2017.
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W.P. (C) No. 25344 of 2017.
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State of Meghalaya v. BSC-C & C (JV), .
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Religare Finvest Ltd. v. Widescreen Holdings (P) Ltd., ; KMP Expressways Ltd. v. IDBI Bank Ltd., ; PSA Protech and Infralogistics (P) Ltd. v. Food Corpn. of India, OMP (MISC) (COMM) 517 of 2023; Ajanta Soya Ltd. v. Oriental Insurance Co., ; L&T Ltd. v. IIC Ltd., ; Iqbal Singh v. Naresh Kumar, ; Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. v. Madhyanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd., ; and ATS Infrastructure Ltd. v. Rasbehari Traders, O.M.P. (T) (COMM.) 91/2023
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