Supreme Court: In a civil appeal against a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dismissing an appeal under Section of the (‘CPC’) and Cross Objections filed under Order XLI Rule 22 respectively, against a judgment and decree pertaining to a property dispute in favour of the respondents, the Division Bench of C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol, JJ. dealt with the issue that whether the present appellant/ original defendants were entitled to the entire property, in line with the position that their mother, by virtue of the , would have absolute rights over the subject property and, therefore, be able to bequeath the same by way of Will to her successors.
The Bench dismissing the appeal, clarified that the partition deed of 1933 clears that 3.55 Cents of land would be enjoyed by appellants’ mother as a life interest and thereafter would devolve upon the two lines of succession. The absolute rights extended only to 2.09 Cents of land, as per the partition deed of 1933.
Genesis
The dispute pertained to the succession of property between stepbrothers. By way of a partition deed dated 25-08-1933 (‘partition deed of 1933’), the mother of the present appellant was given the right to enjoy the property in question, and it was stipulated therein that after her death, the present respondent and appellant would be entitled to half share each. The appellant’s mother passed away in 1973 and the property was divided among the two branches of successors. A suit was instituted by the respondents/ original plaintiff demanding partition. However, the present appellant/ original defendants repeatedly put off and evaded the same. It was contended that their mother by a registered Will bequeathed the scheduled properties to 2nd defendant/ daughter-in-law in the Original Suit. However, this contention was denied, stating that her rights did not augment into absolute rights and that she had the right to enjoy the scheduled properties for life, as given under the registered partition deed.
The Trial Court concluded that the appellant’s mother had no right to execute a Will in favour of her daughter-in-law/ 2nd defendant in the Original Suit and that she did not acquire absolute rights under the (‘the Act’) and as such the property would still vest with the respondent-plaintiffs as per the partition deed of 1933. Hence, the appellant, aggrieved by the findings of the Trial Court, preferred an appeal under Section 96 of CPC, which came to be dismissed by the High Court, forming the impugned decision.
The appellant-defendants favour the application of Section of , while the plaintiff-respondents favour the application of Section 14(2).
Analysis and Decision
The Court relied on V. Tulsamma v. V. Sesha Reddy , wherein the law around Section 14 was crystallised as follows:
“It is well settled that under the Hindu law, the husband has got a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he is possessed of properties then his wife is entitled as of right to be maintained out of such properties… Thus the position is that the right of maintenance may amount to a legal charge if such a charge is created either by an agreement between the parties or by a decree.”
The Court noted that in Mangat Mal v. Punni Devi , Maintenance was discussed as- “Maintenance, as we see it, necessarily must encompass a provision for residence. Maintenance is given so that the lady can live in the manner, more or less, to which she was accustomed. The concept of maintenance must, therefore, include provision for food and clothing and the like and take into account the basic need of a roof over the head…. Where provision is made in this manner, by giving a life interest in property for the purposes of residence, that provision is made in lieu of a pre-existing right to maintenance and the Hindu lady acquires far more than the vestige of title which is deemed sufficient to attract Section 14(1).”
To decipher whether the right of maintenance is sufficient for the property given in lieu thereof to transform into absolute ownership, by way of Section 14(1) of the Act, the Court relied on Jaswant Kaur v. Harpal Singh wherein the view taken in Gulwant Kaur v. Mohinder Singh was affirmed. In Gulwant Kaur (supra), it was laid down that- “The very right to receive maintenance is sufficient title to enable the ripening of possession into full ownership if she is in possession of the property in lieu of maintenance. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of an exception to Section 14(1) and provides for a situation where property is acquired by a female Hindu under a written instrument or a decree of Court and not where such acquisition is traceable to any antecedent right.”
The Court reiterated that Hindu Women’s right to maintenance is not by virtue of any statute, but is found in Shastric Hindu law; maintenance has to be proper, appropriate and adequate, giving the woman so maintained the ability to continue to live the life, similar to what she once lived; and that the very right to receive maintenance is a sufficient title to enable the ripening of possession into full ownership if she is in possession of the property in lieu of maintenance.
The Court noted that in the matter at hand, the appellants’ mother was given absolute right to her property, qua 2.09 Cents of land and a life interest in respect of 3.55 Cents of land. The Court agreed with the findings of the Courts below, that absolute rights extended only to 2.09 Cents. The Court also clarified that the maintenance given to appellants’ mother was in no manner insufficient to warrant interference in line with Punni Devi (supra).
Reiterating, the Court stated that “Property given in lieu of maintenance would solidify into absolute ownership by action of Section 14(1) of HSA, 1956.”
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