E
ver suit is a voyage to truth. A suit once instituted can be divided into the stages of (a) completion of pleadings; (b) leading of evidence during trial; and (c) its adjudication. While the CPC prescribes a directory period for completion of pleadings, there are no defined timelines for completion of a trial or adjudication of a suit. Adjudication of a suit in India can typically take a decade or more, and while drafting an application under Order 22
CPC, one notices that such adjudication often tends to eclipse the life of a litigant. There is a general perception that the determination of truth can only be achieved through the rigours of a trial. Once a party through its pleadings is successful in presenting a triable issue to the Court, the doors to a long-drawn trial are unlocked. A system where there are no timelines governing the conclusion of a suit aids a litigant who is inclined to delay the determination of their dishonesty.However, the CPC empowers a plaintiff to secure a decree at an early stage of the suit. The invocation of this power can be sought contemporaneous to completion of pleadings as courts exercise inherent powers under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC to pass a decree on admissions by the defendant. However, the effectiveness of exercise of such inherent powers is whittled primarily due to the strictures laid down by the Supreme Court which restrict exercise of any meaningful discretion by the courts. It is considered that an activist court is an answer to irresponsible suits. However, the fetters on discretion placed through rulings of the Supreme Court render such activism inconceivable.
Order 12 Rule 6
Order 12 Rule 6 recognises a plaintiff’s right to secure a speedy judgment when their claim is “admitted” by a defendant. It has been repeatedly declared by the Supreme Court that power under Order 12 Rule 6 is discretionary, and can only be exercised in the face of “clear, unambiguous, and unqualified” admissions. While there are rulings of the Supreme Court which recognise that an admission can be inferred from the pleadings of the party, there is usually reluctance on part of the courts to carry out such inference in lieu of frequent reiterations of the rule that admissions must be unqualified and unequivocal.
The aforesaid limited scope of under Order 12 Rule 6 is pedantic. The threshold of “clear, unambiguous, and unqualified” would ordinarily require a party to specifically agree to the correctness of the plaint. When contents of the plaint are denied and a defence is set up, there is no duty case upon the court to examine whether the defence taken raises a meaningful triable issue. So long as a party denies the case set up in the plaint, and presents a defence, a decree on admissions is usually deterred. This approach empowers an erring defendant to engage in false or evasive denials without impunity, and raise frivolous defences, so as to succeed in its effort to raise a triable issue. While the attempts to curb such malaise through introduction of Order 8 Rule 3-A and Order 13-A CPC, a purposive interpretation of Order 12 Rule 6 can achieve similar ends.
The contours of jurisdiction under Order 12 Rule 6 are required to be elevated and the courts ought to be empowered to exercise meaningful discretion. The enquiry under Order 12 Rule 6 should not be a mechanical search for admissions. Instead, courts should—
(i) identify the defence in the written statement and the legality thereof;
(ii) examine whether there exists requisite pleadings and documents on record to prove such defence during evidence; and
(iii) examine whether proof of such defence is permissible under the rules of evidence.
While there are rulings of the Delhi High Court which envisage such course of action ; they lay pale against the threshold mandated by the Supreme Court. The pedantic approach of the Supreme Court in matters concerning exercise of discretion under Order 12 Rule 6 has effectively inhibited the courts from exercising any meaningful discretion; and the same is reflected in its recent rulings.
Recent rulings of the Supreme Court on Order 12 Rule 6
(i) Karan Kapoor
A suit for eviction was filed by the landlord against the tenant. The tenant admitted termination of its tenancy, but pleaded that it had an agreement with the landlord for sale of the tenanted premises. Noticing that termination of tenancy was an admitted fact, a decree on admissions was granted by the trial court in favour of the plaintiff. The defence of a subsisting agreement to sell was considered and rejected by the trial court and the Appellate Court. The decree on admissions was however set aside by the Supreme Court, observing that the defence raised by the tenant raised a triable issue.
A perusal of the judgment reveals that while observing that there is a triable issue, there is no consideration by the Supreme Court of what specifically such issue is. There is no examination by the Supreme Court of the legality of the defence raised. For instance, when such a defence on the basis of an agreement to sell was taken, possible considerations by the Court, which could have dispensed the requirement of a trial are:
(a) Whether the documents produced by the defendant constitute a valid agreement to sell?
(b) Whether the agreements to sell bears the requisite stamp duty and can be proved during evidence?
(c) Whether the agreement to sell is enforceable?
(d) Whether the defendant has any lawful basis to justify its possessory rights after the termination of its tenancy?
(ii) Vikrant Kapila
A suit for partition was contested by certain defendants on the solitary ground of a will propounded by them. The Single Judge, after examining the defence as well as the contents of the will, passed a decree on admissions under Order 12 Rule 6. It was observed that even if the defendants were successful in proving the will, the terms of the will would still not confer any title in the testator’s estate upon the defendants. The judgment on admissions was however set aside by the Supreme Court, holding that when a will is set up by a defendant, the Court cannot look at its terms without the will being proved in accordance with the provisions of the . It was also observed by the Supreme Court that there were no unambiguous admissions made by the contesting defendants in their written statement.
However, the Supreme Court failed to consider whether the denial in pleadings was meaningful, and raised a triable issue. Insofar as the view that it was impermissible for the Single Judge to interpret clauses of the will without such will being proved, the same reflects the Supreme Court’s precedence to technicalities over exercise of meaningful discretion. The Supreme Court failed to consider that a decree on admissions in the case was passed (a) after accepting the defence raised by the defendant on demur; and (b) examining the legality of such defence.
Analysis
The aforesaid rulings of the Supreme Court indicate that a decree on admissions is required to be deterred so long as a defence is raised. The general theme emanating from these rulings is that courts are not empowered to examine the merits of the defence while adjudicating applications under Order 12 Rule 6. Such limited scope of inquiry not just defeats the valuable right of a plaintiff to secure a decree, but also inhibits the Court from exercising meaningful discretion. When a defendant makes a clear, unambiguous or an unqualified admission, the Court is already empowered to pass a decree under Order 15 CPC as the parties are not at issue. Therefore, the threshold declared by the Supreme Court is antithetical to the legislative spirit of Order 12 Rule 6. The true purpose of Order 12 Rule 6 would be achieved when court’s examination of a defence is allowed to be more purposive, and akin to examination carried out in matters of summary jurisdiction. The mechanical search for admissions, without a purposive examination of a superfluous defence, serves no meaningful purpose. It severs the limbs of meaningful discretion from the court and relegates parties to a trial, which is not likely to change the outcome of a case.
Parting notes
If courts cannot dictate the timelines within which trials ought to be included, there should be a greater emphasis towards reducing the instances where a trial is warranted. It is clear that the courts are vested with discretionary powers to cut short the lifespan of a suit, and bring an end to a possibly long-drawn legal battle. However, it is also apparent that courts are restrained from exercising meaningful discretion. Therefore, it is imperative that the Supreme Court empowers a purposive and meaningful exercise of discretion by courts to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of our justice dispensation system.
*Advocate, practising in Delhi. Author can be reached at: adv.ashishkr19@gmail.com.
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Karan Kapoor v. Madhuri Kumar,
Karan Kapoor v. Madhuri Kumar,
Vikrant Kapila v. Pankaja Panda,
Pankaja Panda v. Leela Kapila, .
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